Penn State International Law Review
Volume 9
Number 1 Dickinson Journal of International Law

Article 7

1991

Libel Suits Against American Media in Foreign
Courts
Kathleen A. O'Connell

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
O'Connell, Kathleen A. (1991) "Libel Suits Against American Media in Foreign Courts," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 9:
No. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol9/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

Libel Suits Against American Media in
Foreign Courts
I.

Introduction

American print and broadcast media have expanded significantly into international markets during recent decades. This growth
has undoubtedly increased profits for American media outlets. It has
also allowed American media to acquire even more worldwide respect for its news than it has enjoyed in the past. Yet with all these
positives, there are bound to be negatives as well. Perhaps one of the
most threatening of these is the fact that the expansion into international markets has exposed American media to libel suits in foreign
courts. Since foreign libel law often differs significantly from the
United States' media-protective law in this area, exposure to suits
elsewhere is a far from desirable result of expansion.
Recently, the press has noted a growing trend of libel plaintiffs
suing American media in foreign courts.' An American attorney, Leonard Boudin,2 filed an action against Time in a London court on
behalf of former Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou.'
Boudin was repeatedly 4 quoted in press statements saying that the
suit was not filed in the United States because "the English law of
libel is much more favorable than the American law of libel ....
The prime minister, as a public figure, would have had a much
harder go at it in the United States." F. Lee Bailey, who represented the Prime Minister of the Bahamas, Sir Lynden 0. Pindling,
1. DeBenedictis, Moving Abroad: Libel Plaintiffs Say It's Easier Suing U.S. Media
Elsewhere, A.B.A. J., September 1989, at 38 [hereinafter Moving Abroad]; Docker, Plaintiffs
Take Libel Suits Abroad To Favorable Laws, The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1989, at B1,
col. 3 [hereinafter Favorable Laws]. The Wall Street Journal article indicated that there were
a minimum of four libel suits against American media defendants pending in foreign courts
and that actions were pending against The Wall Street Journal in Europe and Asia, stemming
respectively from its European and Asia editions. Favorable Laws, supra note 1, at BI, col. 3.
2. Mr: Boudin passed away November 24, 1990. Edward Copeland, Partner, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, New York, New York, was serving as counsel
for the case as of the summer of 1990.
3. Papandreou, a Harvard educated scholar and political exile until democracy was restored in 1976, was first elected prime minister in 1981, re-elected in 1985, and defeated in
June of 1989 in a bid for second re-election. United Press International, September 27, 1989;
Reuters, July 28, 1989. Constantine Mitsotakis was Prime Minister of Greece as of the summer of 1990. Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1990, at 16, col. 1.
4. Favorable Laws, supra note 1, at BI, col 3; Moving Abroad, supra note 1, at 38. See
also Reuters Library Report, May 8, 1989.
5. Moving Abroad, supra note 1, at 38.
6. Pindling has been Prime Minister of the Bahamas since January, 1967. He has also
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in Canada against National Broadcasting Company (NBC) echoed
Boudin's explanation. 7 Still, the fact remains that American media
have exposed themselves to this litigation by circulating their publications in foreign markets and allowing their electronic transmissions
to be broadcast outside the United States.
This Comment will first explore the gradual growth of American media into a leading position in foreign markets. English libel
law and a current English action, Papandreou v. Time will then be
discussed. Next, Canadian libel law and a recent Canadian action,
Pindling v. National Broadcasting Company (NBC), will be examined. American libel law will be then described together with two
recent suits filed in the United States, Sharon v. Time and Desai v.

Hersh. An analysis of how, in each instance, the choice of forum was
supported by the plaintiff's goals in filing the suit will lead to the
conclusion that both the Papandreou and Pindling suits may have
been properly filed in foreign courts, and that it is too early to

pinpoint a trend in forum-shopping among libel plaintiffs based
solely upon a handful of cases filed in foreign courts against Ameri-

can media defendants.
II.

International Expansion of American Media

Great Britain was actually the first nation to become a leader in
international communications.8 Rigid control over oceanic cables and

information centers staved off competition from other countries until
the United States, touting the benefits of the free movement of information to international business development, infiltrated following

World War II. While formal efforts to assure free flow created ambiguous results, the United States ultimately achieved its goal during
the years of 1948-68 when its technology leapt ahead of that in the

rest of the world, causing American communications instruments to
come into world-wide demand and use. 10
served as Financial Minister since October, 1984. Facts on File World New Digest, Marsh 23,
1990, at 213.
7. "[T]he suit was brought abroad in part because 'there is no future in it for a public
figure [in the U.S.].'" Favorable Laws, supra note 1, at BI, col. 3.
8. Schiller, Free Flow of Information - for Whom? in MASS MEDIA POLICIES IN
CHANGING CULTURES 106 (G. Gerbner ed. 1977) [hereinafter Free Flow of Information].
9. Id. at 106-7. The United States made sure it had the support of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on the issue of free flow of
information. UNESCO, one of the peace-keeping structures established following World War
II, id. at 110, created a special division to assure the attainment of this very goal: The Mass
Communications Division. Id. at 11. See also A. SbMTH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION:
How WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES THE WORLD, 31-2 (1980). The Mass Communications
Division was initially an adamant supporter of free flow of communications, but its support has
since faltered with the growing recognition of the need to protect privacy rights. Id. at 113.
See also Lowry, Transborder Data Flow: Public and Private International Law Aspects, 6
Hous. J. INT'L L. 159 (1984); H. SCHILLER, INFORMATION AND THE CRISIS ECONOMY (1986).
10. Free Flow of Information, supra note 8, at 112.
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The American media have assumed a central role in world-wide
activity ever since by shaping the large-market growth of all the
forms of mass media. 1 Ironically Great Britain, as the gateway to
the British Commonwealth market, served as the major catalyst in
the United States' growth into a media power by using American
communications products. 2 This connection may have also contributed to English becoming the dominant language of international
media."3
In recent years, Asian countries have become recognized technological powers. Still, American media have continued to exert substantial international influence by becoming affiliated with multinational corporations and by joining together to form large corporate
entities.' 4
The strength of the United States media presence in international markets is demonstrated by the fact that eighty percent of the
television programs broadcast in the Western Hemisphere were produced in the United States.' 5 The COMSAT Act of 1962 provided
further means for the United States to gain dominance in international broadcasting by creating an international partnership in a private corporation based in the United States for the purpose of profitably developing an international space communications system.' 6
American print media are equally influential internationally.
American newspapers, magazines and news agencies have served as
models for prestige or elite newspatiers around the world. 7 The
11. Tunstall, Media Imperialism? in AMERICAN MEDIA AND MASS CULTURE: LEFT PERSPECTIVES 540 (D. Lazere ed. 1987) [hereinafter Media Imperialism]. "By 1970, the international strength of America advertising agencies had succeeded Hollywood as the single most
remarkable aspect of American media presence." Tunstall, The American Role in Worldwide
Mass Communication in MASS MEDIA POLICIES IN CHANGING CULTURES 8 (G. Gerbner ed.
1977) [hereinafter The American Role in Worldwide Mass Communication]. See also, W.
READ, AMERICA'S MASS MEDIA MERCHANTS

12.
13.

14.

96-143 (1976).

The American Role in Worldwide Mass Communication, supra note 11, at 9.
Id.
B. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (1983). See also, B. COMPAINE (ed.), WHO

OWNS MEDIA?: CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MASS COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

(1979).

15. Media Imperialism,supra note 11, at 541 quoting A. WELLS, PICTURE TUBE IMPERIALISM: THE IMPACT OF U.S. TELEVISION ON LATIN AMERICA, 121 (1972). "The countries
that are strongly regional exporters of media tend themselves to be unusually heavy importers
of American media." Id. at 550.
16. Other nations have complained that the United States has been too dominant in this
partnership. Riegel, Satellite Communications and National Power in MASS MEDIA POLICIES
IN CHANGING CULTURES 66-7 (G. Gerbner ed. -1977).
17.

The American Role in Worldwide Mass Communication, supra note 11, at 6. For

example, The Wall Street Journal began regular circulation of an Asian edition in 1976, and
now has subscribers in China, Japan, Singapore and Malaysia. J. TUNSTALL, THE MEDIA ARE
AMERICAN, 273 (1977)

[hereinafter THE MEDIA ARE AMERICAN]. Other international, print
circulations include The InternationalHerald Tribune (jointly published by The New York
Times and The Washington Post), The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor Weekly, The Miami Herald, Time Magazine, Newsweek International,
and Reader's Digest. W. READ, AMERICA'S MASS MEDIA MERCHANTS, 96-143 (1976).
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United States popularized the tabloid form originally introduced in
Great Britain.1" American print media are frequently quoted in foreign publications. 9 The United States' two wire services, Associated
Press and United Press International, "dominate the distribution of
foreign news to newspapers, radio, and television and monopolize the
world wirephoto market."" ° Many foreign newspapers borrow heav21

ily from American wire services.
The success of American media in foreign markets is accepted

today. 2 As the unmatched leader in development of new media, the
United States has established the foundations which have later been
adopted by other countries.2 3 Critics have decried this heavy pres-

ence of American media in international markets, referring to it as

"part of the general efforts of the American military industrial complex to subject the world to military control, electronic surveillance
2
and homogenized American commercial culture." 4
Observers have also noted that by disseminating its media, the
United States is in effect spreading the democratic ideals embodied
in that media.2 5 There is some indication, however, that these effects
are felt more often in affluent countries; in poorer countries the
prime receivers of American media are the upper classes and the
government uses the media system to maintain the status quo. 2
Despite these criticisms of American dominance, others2 7 view
this virtual monopoly of American media as a necessary evil caused
by the failure of many countries besides the United States, Britain
and France 8 to develop their own national identity. 9
18. The American Role in Worldwide Mass Communication, supra note 11, at 6.
19. W. READ, AMERICA'S MASS MEDIA MERCHANTS 146 (1976).
20. The American Role in Worldwide Mass Communication, supra note 11, at 6.
21. Id. Where they don't actually pirate the information, foreign publications mimic the
American style of relaying it. Id. Attempts to form other competitive wire services have proved
unsuccessful, even though Reuters existed before the American wire services and remains a
contender. Barrett, The Global News Wholesalers in MASS MEDIA POLICIES IN CHANGING
CULTURES 14-16 (G. Gerbner ed. 1977). See also A. SMITH. THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION: How WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES THE WORLD

68-110 (1980).

22.
23.
MASS

Media Imperialism, supra note 11, at 545-6.
THE MEDIA ARE AMERICAN, supra note 17, at 263. See also W. READ, AMERICA'S
MEDIA MERCHANTS (1976); J. MERRILL, GLOBAL JOURNALISM: A SURVEY OF THE

WORLD'S MASS MEDIA

24.

(1983).

Media Imperialism, supra note 11, at 546 discussing H. SCHILLER, MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE (1969). See also, A. SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION: How WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES THE WORLD 41-67, 148-73 (1980); J. MERRILL,
GLOBAL JOURNALISM: A SURVEY OF THE WORLD'S MASS MEDIA 7-14 (1983).
A25. By exporting media, the United States is essentially exporting its politics. THE MEDIA ARE AMERICAN, supra note 17, at 263.
26. Id.
27. Media Imperialism, supra note 11, at 540.
28. Id.
29. This lack of identity is caused in part by a mix of languages, religions and cultures,
as well as more substantial differences between the social classes and the lifestyle in urban and
rural areas. Id.
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Definition of Libel
A defamatory statement is one
which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right
thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be
shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious
to him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business.30

The theory behind prosecuting defamation is the right of every
human being to shape his own reputation as he desires without interference from others, regardless of whether or not he himself is present at the time the defendant damages the plaintiffs reputation
through his communication to a third person.3 1
A defamatory statement is classified as libel or slander depending upon its nature. Slander arises from "spoken words, sounds,
looks, signs, gesture, or [in] some other non-permanent form." 2 By
contrast, libel results when the defamatory statement occurs in any
33
permanent form.
30. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (l)(ii)(10) (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone
4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND]. If a defamatory statement is
exceedingly serious, and damages will not even come close to compensating the plaintiff, the
claim may be prosecuted under criminal libel. Id. at (5)(1)-(3). See also, Wilson v. Reed
[1860] 175 E.R. 1000; G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL, MEDIA LAW: THE RIGHTS OF JOURNALISTS BROADCASTERS AND PUBLSHERS, 58-60 (1984) [hereinafter G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL].

31.

HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND,

supra note 30, at (1)(i)(l). Defamation is mainly

prosecuted under common law, but there are several relevant statutory enactments governing
special areas of concern: Libel Act, 1792, 32 Geo. 3, ch. 60 (states the respective functions of
the judge and jury in libel cases). Criminal Libel Act, 1819, 60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, ch. 8
(gives court right of seizure upon conviction for seditious libel). Parliamentary Papers Act,
1840, 3 & 4 Vict., ch. 9 (gives absolute privilege to all publications of Parliament). Libel Act,
1843, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 96 and Libel Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 75 (gives the press a defense of
qualified privilege). Newspapers, Printers and Reading Rooms Repeal Act, 1869, 32 & 33
Vict., ch. 24 (deals with identification requirements for printers). Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., ch. 60 (gives court right of summary jurisdiction in some
criminal libel actions). Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 64 (gives
privilege to fair and contemporaneous newspaper publishing). Slander of Women Act, 1891,
54 & 55 Vict., ch. 51 (provides exception that this slander is not actionable without proof of
special damages). The Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 66 (provides that
offer of an apology can be used as a defense if refused and act as bar to an action if accepted
and categorizes broadcast defamation as libel). Printer's Imprint Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch.
31 (exempts printer from obligations imposed by Newspapers, Printers and Reading Rooms
Repeal Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 24). Cable and Broadcasting Act, 1984, s. 57(1), sch. 5,
para. 2, Vol. 45 (gives privilege to fair and contemporaneous newspaper and broadcast publishing). 24 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 85-129 (4th ed. 1986). The English common law definition of
a defamatory statement is reflected in both the Canadian and American definitions of this

term. See

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

375-6 (5th ed. 1979); Good v. North Delta-Surrey Sen-

tinel and Elsom [1985] 1 W.W.R. 166 (B.C.S.C.) affd [1986] 3 W.W.R. (B.C.S.C.). See also
Kawaja v. Western Printing and Publishing Ltd. [1954] 34 M.P.R. 245 (Nfld.).
32. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 30, at (l)(ii)(12). Again, the Canadian
and American definitions are parallel: Canada v. Lukasik [1985] 37 A.L.R.2d 170; BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1244 (5th ed. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(2) (1977).
33. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 30, at (1)(ii)(11). See Monson v. Tus-

sauds Ltd. and Louis Tussaud [18941 1 Q.B. 671. Once again, the Canadian and American
definitions are parallel: Bulletin v. Shephard [1917] 39 D.L.R. 339; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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Libel Law and Current Cases
Outside the United States
1. England

a. English Libel Law.-"London is the libel capital of the
world," 4 or so one writer has noted.36 The major factor contributing
to the popularity of filing libel suits in English courts is the fact that
any damages awarded are tax-free. 8 Another, and perhaps more
calculated reason English forums are favored is that English common law is "plaintiff friendly" since the burdens of the respective
parties favors the plaintiff.
(1) Plaintiffs absolute burden of proof.-When a plaintiff
brings an action for defamation, the basis of the action is usually the
"natural and ordinary meaning ' 3 7 of the words. When the allegedly
defamatory words are part of an indivisible article, the jury must
consider the whole article to determine this meaning. 38
As long as there is only one natural and ordinary meaning" to
the words in question, the plaintiff does not need to specify what that
meaning is in his pleading. 40 However, where the central words are
capable of having more than one meaning, the plaintiff should specify the various possible meanings "not only because it may limit the
issues and save time and money but also because it will give the trial
judge an opportunity to consider beforehand how to rule on the
'
meanings which the words are capable of bearing." 41
A statement which does not forthrightly defame the plaintiff
may still be deemed defamatory due to the secondary meaning
which may be inferred from it: this is called innuendo.42 When a
plaintiff chooses this basis for defamation claim, extrinsic facts must
be pled in support of the assertion and if no extrinsic facts are provided, the defamatory status of the words may only be judged according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words on their
face. 3
824 (5th ed. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(1) (5th ed. 1979).
34. G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL, supra note 30, at 23.
35. Id.
36. Libel damages are also tax-free in the United States. Id. See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986).
37. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 30, at (4)(iii)(174).
38. S & K Holdings Ltd. v. Throgmorton Publications Ltd. [1972] 3 All Eng. Rep. 492.
39. HALSBtURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 30, at (4)(iii)(174).
40. Id.
41. Allsop v. Church of England Newspaper [1972] 2 Q.B. 161, 163. See also, DDSA
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1972] 3 All Eng. Rep. 417.
42. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 30, at (4)(iii)(175).
43. Grubb v. Bristol United Press Ltd. [1963] 1 Q.B. 309. See also Rawlings v. Norbury
[1858] 172 Eng. Rep. 1253.
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The test for the existence of innuendo is whether, considering
the entire article and surrounding circumstances, a reasonable reader
would find the words defamatory and injurious to the plaintiff."" The
reader in question must have known any facts necessary to perceive
the innuendo at the time he receives the published defamatory statement. 5 He must also be "endowed with considerable wisdom and
knowledge of the way of the world."' 6
A plaintiff seeking to prove the existence of innuendo need not
present witnesses who actually derived the defamatory meaning
claimed from a reading of the words. If the hypothetical reasonable
person with the relevant knowledge would have understood the words
to refer to the plaintiff, basis for a claim of defamation is complete.
The association made by the reasonable reader is the key.47 The defendant need not intend to harm the plaintiff; he need only intend
8
that his readers connect the words with the plaintiff.'
Once a statement has been found defamatory in nature, malice
is inferred: "The law implies malice except where the occasion justifies the publication. If a person writes defamatory matter of another,
however honestly he may believe it to be true, if it be in fact untrue,
the law implies malice."' 9 Malice inferred from a defamatory statement is referred to as malice in law. It is defined as "a wrongful act
done intentionally, without just cause of excuse."5
(2) Defendant's burden of proof.-In order to rebut malice in
law, the defendant may plead justification, or truth of the statements
made, as a defense. 5 1 "Truth is a complete defence to any defamatory statement of fact, whatever the motives for its publication, and
however much its revelation is unjustified or contrary to the public
interest."5' 2 To satisfy the requirements of this defense, the defendant: 1) must make clear the meaning he is attempting to justify;5 3
2) may raise a defense on the whole of an indivisible article and;4
44. Newstead v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. [1940] 1 K.B. 377 citing Jones v. E.
Hulton & Co. [1909] 2 K.B. 377, 380. See also Hayward v. Thompson [1981] 3 All Eng. Rep.
450.
45. Grapelli v. Derek Block [1981] 2 All Eng. Rep. 272, 274.
46. G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL, supra note 30, at 28.
47. Hough v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. [1940] 3 All Eng. Rep. 31. See also
Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd. [1929] 2 K.B. 331.
48. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 30, at (l)(iii)(17); Hulton v. Jones
[1910] A.C. 20; Read v. Ambridge [1834] 172 Eng. Rep. 1253. See also Fisher v. Clement
[1830] 109 Eng. Rep. 526; Haire v. Wilson [18291 109 Eng. Rep. 239.
49. Darby v. Ouseley [1856] 156 Eng. Rep. 1093, 1096.
50. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 30, at (1)(iii)(16).
51. Cooper v. Wakely [1828] 173 Eng. Rep. 1148.
52. G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL, supra note 30, at 44.
53. Lucas-Box v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. and Associated Newspapers Group
[1986] 1 All Eng. Rep. 177.
54. Polly Peck v. Trelford [1986] 2 All Eng. Rep. 84. See also S. & K Holdings Ltd. v.
Throgmorton Publications Ltd [19721 3 All Eng. Rep. 492.
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3) may justify any and all of the alternative meanings beyond what

plaintiff claims as long as the words are capable of bearing these
55
meanings.
The defendant has two other possible defenses: fair comment
and privilege. 56 Fair comment may be pled by a writer as long as he

did not make the allegedly defamatory statements concerning a matter of public interest and "unless the expressions are so unreasonable
as to be reckless, and therefore, in a legal sense, malicious.

'5 7

In

making an assertion of fair comment, a defendant .must state the
particulars of the facts he depends upon but need not distinguish all

the elements of facts and opinion in the article in question."8 The
defendant may claim fair comment in the whole of an indivisible
article. 59 The test for fair comment may be simply stated: "Was this
an opinion, however exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, which was
honestly held by the writer."8 "
Defendant's third and final defense is qualified privilege. This
defense is allowed "on certain occasions to a person acting in good
faith and without any improper motive who makes a statement about
another person which is in fact untrue and defamatory."" Usually
both the party making the statement and the party receiving it must
prove that they acted under some type of duty."2
(3) Plaintiffs contingent burden of proof.-In order to refute

either the defense of fair comment" or the defense of qualified privilege, the plaintiff may prove the defendant was motivated by actual
malice.64 This form of malice is defined as: "ill will or spite towards

the plaintiff or any indirect or improper motive in the defendant's
mind at the time of the publication which is his sole or dominant
motive for publishing the words complained of."' 5
The plaintiff may satisfy the burden of proving actual malice
55. Prager v. Times Newspapers [1988] 1 All E.R. 300. See also Williams v. Reason
[1988] 1 All Eng. Rep. 262.
56. Defendant's standard of proof for all three is "on balance of probabilities: 51%
proof will suffice." G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL, supra note 30, at 42 (1984).
57. Morrison v. Belcher [18631 176 Eng. Rep. 280, 283. See also Campbell v. Spotiswoode [1836] 122 Eng. Rep. 288.
58. Lord v. Sunday Telegraph Ltd. [1971] 1 Q.B. 235.
59. S & K Holdings v. Throgmorton Publications Ltd. [1972] 3 All Eng. Rep. 492.
60. Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers [1958] 2 All Eng. Rep. 516, 518. See also Broadway Approvals Ltd. v. Odhams Press Ltd. [1965] 2 All Eng. Rep. 523.

61.

HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND,

supra note 30, at (3)(i)(108).

62. White v. Stone [1939] 3 All Eng. Rep. 507 quoting Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309.
See also Somerville v. Hawkins [1851] 119 Eng. Rep. 504; Hebditch v. MacIllwaine [1894] 2
Q.B. 54; Jenoure v. Delinge [1891] A.C. 73; Neville v. Fine Art and General Insurance [1897]
A.C. 68; War v. Jolly [1834) 172 Eng. Rep. 1336.
63. Thomas v. Bradbury Agnew & Co. [1906] 2 K.B. 627.
64. The King v. Rule [1937] 2 K.B. 375.
65. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 30, at (5)(i)(145).
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by: 1) using extrinsic evidence; s6 2) asking the jury to evaluate the
malice on the face of the statement;' 7 3) locating one instance in
which there was evidence or spite or ill motive;6 8 4) demonstrating
that any opinions expressed were not honestly held;" and 5) revealing excess language within the privileged occasion. 0
b. Papandreou v. Time.-The plaintiff-favorable elements of
English libel law will be applied in the suit filed by Andreas Papandreou, the former Prime Minister of Greece, against the American
media defendant, Time Magazine, in a London court. The case was
originally slated to be heard before the High Court of Justice,
Queen's Bench Division71 in London beginning November 30, 19897
but was still pending, according to counsel for the case,73 in the summer of 1990.
The action concerns an article appearing in the March 13, 1989
issue of Time which included "allegations by George Koskotas, a
Greek banker, who claimed Papandreou had drained the Bank of
Crete in Athens of millions of dollars in the form of payoffs made to
him and officials of his party. '7 4 Stemming from this scandal, "several PASOK [Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement] ministers either
quit or were fired over the past year, and some high-ranking officials
were later arrested for allegedly funneling Bank of Crete funds illic78
itly into PASOK's campaign coffers."
The complaint quotes lengthily from the article, and alleges:
10. In their natural and ordinary meaning the words complained of in paragraph 9 hereof meant and were understood to
mean that:
(1) The Plaintiff was party to the embezzlement of
monies . . .
(2) The Plaintiff protected from investigation the
dishonest activities of Mr. Koskotas in relation to the
bank of Crete.
(3) The Plaintiff accepted as bribes monies embez66.
67.
68.
69.

Wright v. Woodgate [1835] 150 Eng. Rep. 244.
Boston v. W.S. Bagshaw [1966] 2 All E.R. 906.
Dickson v. Earl of Wilton [1859] 175 Eng. Rep. 790.
Turner v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Pictures Ltd. [1950] 1 All Eng. Rep. 449.

70.

Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309. See also

HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND,

supra

note 30, at (5)(i)(147).
71. Statement of Claim, Papandreou v. Time, 1989 P No. 1668 (High Court of Justice,
Queen's Bench filed June 15, 1989); Defence, Papandreou v. Time, 1989 P No. 1668 (High
Court of Justice, Queen's Bench filed September 4, 1989).
72. Sunday Telegraph Limited, October 8, 1989, at 17.
73. Interview, Edward Copeland, Partner, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky &
Lieberman, New York, New York.
74. United Press International, April 17, 1989; McGraw Hill News, April 17, 1989; Los
Angeles Times, April 18, 1989, at A2, col. 1.
75. United Press International, September 21, 1989.
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zled from the Bank of Crete by Mr. Koskotas.
(4) The Plaintiff blackmailed Mr. Koskotas in relation to the latter's passport violation.
(5) Funds embezzled or taken from the Bank of
Crete by Mr. Koskotas were wrongfully used by the
Plaintiff or expended at the Plaintiff's direction for the
Plaintiff's own purposes.
(6) The Plaintiff wrongfully requested Mr,. Koskotas to embezzle or take funds from the Bank of Crete
for the Plaintiff's own purposes.
(7) The Plaintiff has sought and will seek, if Mr.
to Greece, to have Mr. Koskotas
Koskotas is 7extradited
6
assassinated.
to these allegaThe defendant responded in the following manner
7' 7
tions: "The Statement of Claim is not admitted. "
On September 14, 1989, a committee investigating the Koskotas
allegations recommended that Papandreou together with several of
his cabinet ministers be indicted for corruption. One member of the
committee stated, "while the case is not open and shut, 'events point
to Papandreou.' ,,71 During the two-day debate in which Parliament
formally considered the indictment question, Papandreou made a
personal appearance accepting political responsibility, since his party
had been in power, but not criminal responsibility for the bank
scandal.80
Papandreou faces criminal charges together with "[tihe chief of
OTE [Hellenic Telecommunications Organization] and the head of
the Greek intelligence organization" ' for a wire-tapping system discovered when the government changed hands," which included
"more than 200 politicians, military officers, senior officials, and
journalists." 8
Developing. facts such as these criminal charges demonstrate
why Papandreou's choice of an English forum for his libel suit
against Time may prove particularly advantageous. In order to prevail in the suit, Time will need to prove that either the statements
made in the article were true or they were made on a privileged
basis. Papandreou will only bear the burden of proving that Time
acted with actual malice in publishing the article if Time claims the
76.

Statement of Claim at 9-10, Papandreou v. Time, 1989 P No. 1668 (High Court of

Justice, Queen's Bench filed June 15, 1989).
77. Defence at 3, Papandreou v. Time, 1989 P No. 1668 (High Court of Justice,
Queen's Bench filed September 4, 1989).
78. United Press International, September 27, 1989. See also Reuters, July 28, 1989.
79. TIME, September 25, 1989, at 38.
80. United Press International, September 27, 1989.
81. United Press International, September 21, 1989.
82.
83.

Id.
Reuters, July 28, 1989.
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defense of fair comment or another privileged defense.
2.

Canada

a.

Canadian Libel Law.-The Canadian law of libel borrows

heavily from English common law. In some instances English law is
actually cited in Canadian cases as an illustration of the accepted

principle of law in a particular area.84
(1) Plaintiffs absolute burden of proof.-In order to set forth a
valid cause of action in defamation, the plaintiff must state the alleged defamatory words with particularity. 5 "If the plaintiff does

not know the exact words uttered, and cannot obtain leave to interrogate before filing his Statement of Claim, he must draft his pleading
as best he can and subsequently apply for leave to administer interrogatories and, after obtaining Answers, amend his Statement of
Claim as necessary."" 6 The concept of innuendo is available under
Canadian common law to prove that a statement which does not ap-

pear defamatory on its face is in reality defamatory in meaning.8"
In Canada, as in England, malice in law is presumed as soon as
a statement is found to be defamatory.8 8 In other words, "[t]he law
presumes that words, that would be defamatory if false, are untrue,
unless and until the defendant proves that they are true. The law
also presumes malice, unless and until the judge rules that the words
were published on a privileged occasion, in which case the burden of
proving malice would fall upon the plaintiff. ' 89
(2) Defendant's burden of proof.-The defendant carries the
weightiest burden: to justify his allegedly defamatory statement by
proving truth." The standard is "substantially true." 91 Intent in
84. Halls v. Mitchell [1928] 2 D.L.R. 97, 102 citing Toogood v. Spyring [1834] 149
Eng. Rep. 1044; Chernesky v. Armadale Publishers Ltd. [1979] 90 D.L.R.(3d) 321, 323 citing
Slim v. Daily Telegraph Ltd. [1968] 2 Q.B. 157; Moffat v. British Columbia Television System
Ltd. [1985] 1 W.W.R. 271, 275 (B.C.S.C.) quoting DDSA Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Times
Newspapers Ltd. [1972] 3 All Eng. Rep. 417; Maloney v. Winnepeg Free Press Company Ltd.
and Herron [19761 4 W.W.R. 292, 292 (B.C.) citing Turner v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Pictures Ltd. [1950] 1 All E.R. 449; Farrell v. St. John's Publishing Co. [1986] 58 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 66, 77 quoting Broadway Approvals Ltd. v. Odhams Press Ltd. [1965] 2 All E.R. 523.
85. Moffat v. British Columbia Television System Ltd. [1985] 1 W.W.R. 271
(B.C.S.C.). See also Shinkaruk v. Jones [1985] 41 Sask. R. 187 (Sask. Q.B.); Shannon v.
King [1931] 4 D.L.R. 438 (C.A.).
86. Berry v. Retail Merchant's Association [1924] 2 D.L.R. 916, 916 (C.A.).
87. Lockington v. Siegrist & Co. [1935] OR. 402; Pherrill v. Sewell [1908] 90 W.R. 63
(C.A.).
88. Canada v. Lukasik [1985] 37 A.L.R.2d 170. See also, Note, Libel Law and the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms: Towards a Broader Protectionfor Media Defendants, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750 (1987).
89. Kawaja v. Western Printing and Publishing Ltd. [1954] 34 M.P.R. 245, 252 (Nfld.).
90. Upton v. Better Business Bureau of the Mainland of British Columbia [1980] 114
D.L.R.(3d) 750). See also Robertson v. Robertson [1932] 45 B.C.R. 460.
91. Kawaja, [1954] 34 M.P.R. at 255.
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making the statement is irrelevant. 2 "If the libel contains defamatory statements both of fact and of opinion, the defendant, under a
plea of justification, must prove that the statements of fact are true
and that the statements of opinion are correct. ' 93 If the statement is
very specific, the defendant need only plead general truth to provide
a valid defense of justification. But if the statement is very general,

the defendant must set forth particulars known by the defendant at
the time of publication demonstrating the truth of his remarks."'
As in English law, the defenses of fair comment and qualified
privilege exist under Canadian law. The test of fair comment is
whether the criticism would be viewed as fair and reasonable by the
ordinary reader of the publication. 5 The defendant must be able to
prove he honestly believed the truth of the facts upon which he relied

in stating his opinion in order to successfully raise this defense.9
However, even if the facts are true, if the statement is defamatory on
97
its face, the defendant's claim will still fail.
Canadian qualified privilege protects statements made under
special circumstances. 9 8 Facts and circumstances serving as the basis
for the assertion of qualified privilege must be specifically stated. 99
These circumstances may vary from case to case, but always must go
beyond mere service of the public interest. 10 0 The existence of privilege is determined by all relevant facts and circumstances, and the
statements must have been made by an individual who is discharging
a "moral, social or legal duty."1'0
(3) Plaintiffs contingent burden of proof.-Under Canadian
common law, the defenses of fair comment and privilege may be re92.
93.

Mengarelli v. Forrest [1972] 2 O.R. 397 (Ont. M.C.).
Upton v. Better Business Bureau of the Mainland of British Columbia [1980] 114

D.L.R.(3d) 750, 753 citing C.

GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER

155 (7th ed. 1974); Vogel v.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [1982] 21 C.C.L.T. 105.
94. Drake v. Overload [1978] 7 A.L.R.(2d) 199 quoting Reid v. Albertan Publishing
Ltd. [1913] 5 A.L.R. 486.
95. Bulletin v. Sheppard [1917] 39 D.L.R. 339.
96. Farrell v. St. John's Publishing Co. [1986] 58 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 6; Chernesky v.
Armadale Publishers Ltd. [1979] 90 D.L.R.(3d) 321. See also Kawaja v. Western Printing
and Publishing Ltd. [1954] 34 M.P.R. 245 (Nfld.); Augustine Automatic Rotary Eng. v. Saturday Night Ltd. [1917] 38 O.L.R. 609.
97. Boys v. Star Printing and Publishing Co. [1927] 60 O.L.R. 592. See also Augustine
Automatic Rotary Eng. v. Saturday Night Ltd. [1917] 38 O.L.R. 609.
98. Winnepeg Steel Granary & Culvert Co. Ltd. v. Canada Ingot Iron Culvert Co. Ltd.
[1912] Man. R. 576; Blagden v. Bennett [1885] 9 O.R. 593 (C.A.).
99. Cladwell v. Buchanan [1903] 2 O.W.R. 839; The Globe and Mail Ltd. v. Boland
[1960] S.C.R. 203; Banks v. The Globe and Mail Ltd. [1961] S.C.R. 474.
100. Littleton v. Hamilton [1974] 4 O.R.(2d) 283; Upton v. Better Business Bureau of
the Mainland of British Columbia [1980] 114 D.L.R.(3d) 750.
101. McGugan v. Davison [1984] 58 N.B.R.(2d) 103, 119; Jerome v. Anderson [1964]
44 D.L.R.(2d) 516. See also Silbernagel v. Empire Stevedoring Company Ltd. [1979] 18
B.C.L.R. 384 (S.C.); Banks v. The Globe and Mail Ltd. [1961] S.C.R. 474; The Globe and
Mail Ltd. v. Boland [1960] S.C.R.203; Halls v. Mitchell [1928] 2 D.L.R. 97; Latta v. Fargery
[1906] 120 W.R. 231; Fenton v. MacDonald [1901] 1 Q.L.R. 422 (C.A.).
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butted by proof of malice. 102 The plaintiff carries the burden of proving actual malice1 " and must do so by setting forth additional evidence in support of this assertion.'"s Actual malice exists when the
plaintiff can prove that the statements in question "were untrue to
the knowledge of the person who uttered them."10 5
The jury determines whether or not this burden has been met.10 6
Malice is not proved when there is merely an indication that the
defendant went beyond the scope of his privilege.1 0 7 However,
"[t]here is malice if the occasion is used for any indirect motive or
purpose other than a sense of duty and the defendant is protected
only if it is used for the reasons for which the protection of the privilege exists."' 1
Other circumstances not necessarily indicating presence of malice include failure to apologize, honestly held belief in the truth and
repetition of the defamation."0 9 Malice is, however, proved if there is
a failure to retract even after the defendant gains knowledge indicating to him that his statement was false. 110 Defendant's motive in repetition of the statement will determine whether the repetition may in
fact be viewed as evidence of malice.'
(4) Recent Revision of Canadian Common Law.-In 1982 Canada attempted to revise its common law of defamation.' 2 Canada's
new legislation protects fundamental freedoms, including freedom of
102. McGugan v. Davidson [1984] 58 N.B.R.(2d) 103.
103. Moores v. Salter [1982) 37 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 128. See also Kawaja v. Western
Printing and Publishing Ltd. [1954] 34 M.P.R. 245 (Nfld.).
104. Robinson v. Estella Mines Ltd. [1953] 10 W.W.R. 374 (B.C.).
105. Woods v. Plummer [1908] 15 O.L.R. 552, 554 (C.A.).
106. Fenton v. MacDonald [1901] 1 O.L.R. 422 (C.A.). See also Seaforth v. Rozell
[1920] 19 O.W.N. 134 (C.A.); Wilcocks v. Howell [1884] 5 OR. 360 (C.A.).
107. Arthur v. Massey-Harris [1934] 2 D.L.R. 124 (B.C.C.A.); Pearson v. Harris
[1937] 3 W.W.R. 602 (B.C.). But see Colvin v. McKay [1889] 17 OR. 212 (C.A.).
108. Kawaja v. Western Printing and Publishing Co. [1954] 34 M.P.R. 245, 254 (Nfld.).
109. Farrell v. St. John's Publishing Co. [1986] 58 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 66.
110. Id. See also Pearson v. Harris [1937] 3 W.W.R. 602(B.C.) quoting W. ODGERS,
LIBEL AND SLANDER 283 (6th ed. 1891). "Evidence of malice may either be extrinsic-as of
previous ill feeling or personal hostility between plaintiff and defendant, threats, rivalry, quabbles ... or intrinsic-the violence of the defendant's language, the mode and extent of publication, etc." Pearson v. Harris [1937] 3 W.W.R. 602, 606 (B.C.).
111. Farrell v. St. John's Publishing Co. [1986] 58 Nfid. & P.E.I.R. 66. See also Pear-

son v. Harris [1937] 3 W.W.R. 602 (B.C.) quoting C. GATLEY,

LIBEL AND SLANDER

609 (6th

ed. 1929). The mindset of the defendant in general is determinative in weighing malice. Malice requires a state of mind arising from "anger, or gross and unreasoning prejudice with
regard to a particular class of persons or a particular subject matter." Pearson v. Harris
[1937] 3 W.W.R. 602, 609 (B.C.).
112. As recently as 1984, Australia debated similar action. E. Lloyd, Defamation Law
Reform, 58 AUST. L.J. 595, 602 (1984). The Australian Law Reform Commission ultimately
rejected reform after examining the general upheavals in American defamation law since the
United States Supreme Court's institution of reforms. Id. at 602-3. Defamation reform may
eventually occur in England where there are currently proposals to Americanize the English
system in other areas. Philipson, No Cup of Tea: English Legal Profession Could Get a More
American Look, A.BA.J. October 1989, at 34.

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:1

the press, to -a greater extent than English common law system as
adopted by Canada.1 1 The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms states in its first two sections:
Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribes by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Fundamental Freedoms
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: . ..
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media communication [emphasis
added] .11
This Charter also includes a preemption provision, holding The
11 5
Charter of Rights and Freedoms supreme over any conflicting law.
The effect of this preemption provision and the Charter as a whole is
that Canadian statutory law now favors the free speech rights of media defendants over the rights of potential plaintiffs to their
reputations.
Law review writers have argued that in order to fully assure the
freedom of press provided for in The Charter, some form of qualified
privilege for media should be enacted. Such a privilege has been argued to be necessary in order to truly approach the degree of freedom of the press provided for under the United States Constitution 116 and the common law which has developed to assure to this
7
right."
b. Pindling v. National Broadcasting Company.-Until further reforms follow the enactment of The Charter of Rights and
113. Section 1 of the Canadian Bill of Rights states: "It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by
reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely. . .(f) freedom of the press." Canadian Bill of Rights, 8-9 Eliz. 11,
ch. 44 (Canada). See also Note, Libel Law and the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms: Towards a Broader Protectionfor Media Defendants, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750
(1987) [hereinafter Libel Law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms].
114. Ritter, The Charterof Rights and Freedoms in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 23 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz ed. 1988).
115. Id.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press [emphasis added]; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievance." Id.
117. The writers argue that since providing more protection for media defendants was
the primary goal of The Charter, the United States' media protective libel law should be used
as a model for further developments toward achieving this end. Libel Law and the Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms, supra note 113, at 750; M. Doody, Freedom of the Press,
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and a New Category of Qualified Privilege,
61 CANADIAN B. REv. 124 (1983).
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Freedoms, libel actions filed in Canada will be decided under the
plaintiff-favorable common law. Lynden 0. Pindling, Prime Minister
of the Bahamas, recently filed suit in Canada against the American
media defendant, The National Broadcasting Company (NBC), concerning broadcasts during 1983 and 1984 which claimed that "Columbian cocaine drug lords were using the island as a base and had
made payoffs to officials." 1 1 8 NBC based the claims made during the
broadcast upon a Justice Department Intelligence Report.1 19 Pindling denied NBC's allegations that he was among the corrupt
officials.1 20
Since the broadcasts, Columbian drug lord Carlos Lehder, who
ran the Bahamian base, has been convicted of drug trafficking and is

serving a life sentence in a U.S. jail. Federal grand juries in Florida
have indicted two former associates of Pindling on drug conspiracy
charges.'
Still, a Bahamian inquiry into Pindling's assets during
August of 1984 indicated that everything was in order. 2 '
The Bahamian named 16 Canadian cable and communications
companies as co-defendants in his $4 million suit. 23 "The Pindling
suit, filed in the Supreme Court of Ontario, marks the first time a
non-Canadian has sued a U.S. Network in Canadian Courts," says
John Loren McDougal, a lawyer for NBC."" Sir Lynden sought $2
million in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive
1

5

damages. 1
In October of 1989, the wire services began reporting that Pindling had dropped his suit against NBC by entering into a confidential settlement 26 in which neither money nor an apology from NBC
for the broadcasts was exchanged. The network was "delighted that
the prime minister has abandoned his lawsuit."12 7 NBC further
stated that "[tlhis is a complete vindication of our journalism. This
lawsuit should never have been brought in the first place.' 28
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
September
123.
124.

Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1989, at A2, col. 5.
Favorable Laws, supra note 1, at BI, col. 3.
The Washington Post, October 10, 1989, at CIO, col. t.v.
The Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1989, at A2, col. 5.
A report to that effect was intended to be issued by the investigatory panel on
28, 1984. United Press International, August 4, 1984.
The Washington Post, October 10, 1989, at CIO, col. t.v.
Favorable Laws, supra note 1, at BI, col. 3.

125. Id.
126. United Press International, October 6, 1989; Reuters, October 6, 1989.
127. United Press International, October 6, 1989.
128. Reuters, October 6, 1989; Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1989, at A2, col. 5. See
also The Washington Post, October 10, 1989, at CIO, col. t.v. The press also indicated that
Pindling was threatening to reinstate the action because he claimed NBC had violated the
terms of the settlement. Wall Street Journal, October 11, 1989, at 8, col. 2; The Washington
Post, October 10, 1989, at CIO,col. t.v.; Reuters, October 6, 1989; United Press International,
October 6, 1989. Gloria Epstein, Canadian Counsel for NBC revealed that Pindling ultimately
made a Motion to Set Aside the Settlement. Both parties filed documents in support of this
Motion but it was never formally heard by the court. The parties agreed to accept the terms of
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Part of the reason for NBC's joy in the settlement is no doubt
its relief in not having to prove the truth of the statements it broadcast concerning the Bahamian. Like Papandreou, Pindling would
have carried the burden of proving NBC acted with actual malice
only if NBC could prove the truth of its broadcast or claimed a privileged defense such as fair comment. This distribution of the burdens
of proof common to English and Canadian libel law differs radically
from the balance of burdens in American libel law.
B.

The United States

1. American Libel Law.-Initially, American libel law closely
paralleled the principles of the English common law, in much the
same way as Canada's does at the present time. But with the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan1 29 in 1964,
the Constitutional provision for a free press"' 0 became the focus of
libel actions. Since succeeding decisions have carefully shaped
American libel law, each case must be considered in turn in order to
capture the flavor of the changes implemented and the reasons be1 31
hind these actions.
New York Times v. Sullivan5 2 involved an advertisement which
appeared in The New York Times concerning non-violent demonstrations by negro students then occurring in southern parts of the
United States. Sullivan, a police officer, claimed to have been defamed in two places in the advertisement through the general characterization of the police response to the demonstrations and filed
suit in an Alabama court. The Court followed the English common
law approach and held that since the statement was libelous on its
face, legal injury and malice could be presumed for purposes of compensatory damages.1 33
Noting that the defendant had no means of escaping liability
under Alabama law, other than by justifying his statements, the
United States Supreme Court articulated a new standard in light of
the First Amendment. 34 The Supreme Court held that in order to
the original settlement and the Motion to Set Aside Settlement was Dismissed without costs.
129. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
131. See Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Towards Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PnrT. L. REv. 91 (1987);
Strossen, In Defense of the Aspirations-But Not the Achievements-Of the U.S. Rules Limiting Defamation Actions By Public Officials or Public Figures, 15 MEin. U.L. REv. 419
(1986); Zillman, The American Approach to Defamation, 9 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 316 (1980).
132. New York Times v. Sullian, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
133. Sullivan v. New York Times, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 25 (1963).
134. The court noted it was making its decision "against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
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state a valid cause of action in defamation, a public official must be
able to prove that "the statement was made with actual mal-

ice-that is, with knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." 18 5 The standard of proof by which such
actual malice must be proved is "convincing clarity."'

6

Under this

new rule of law, the Court could not sustain the Alabama court's
a7
decision against The New York Times.

Criticizing Alabama's rule of law, and, by implication, English
common law, the Court noted:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the
truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel
judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to comparable
"self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the
burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only
false speech will be deterred."' 18

The Court found additional support for its holding by noting the
similar stances assumed by the press and public officials when serving as a defendant in an action. The actual malice standard for
newspapers is thus similar to the immunity afforded public
officers.' 8 9
In St. Amant v. Thompson " the Court considered the meaning
of "with knowledge that it was false, or reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not""" in evaluating a televised speech in
which a series of questions and answers read by the speaker impli-

cated a public official in criminal activity. The Court remanded be-

cause the meaning of the New York Times test " 2 had been misinterpreted by the lower court." 8 The Court noted that the protections
135. Id. at 279-80. See Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1966). Action involving Life's
description of a play and connecting it to Hill's experience of being held hostage in his own
home. The Court found reversible error in the lower court's failure to instruct the jury that
Life was liable only if there was knowing and reckless disregard for falsity in the publication
where there was a possibility of mere negligence. Id. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356
(1965). Concerning statement implicating a Chief of Police and a County Attorney in a diabolical plot, the court erred in its instruction by inferring that liability could come from mere
intent to inflict harm, rather than intent to inflict harm through falsehood. Id. One reason for
articulating this special standard for public officials, like Papandreou and Pindling, is that they
usually have access to media to rebut any statement made. Libel Law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 113, at 760 n.
136. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-286. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477-U.S.
242 (1985). When a public figure makes a motion for summary judgment, the court must use
the convincing clarity standard of proof in deciding whether or not to grant the motion.
137. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286.
138. Id. at 279. See id. (Black and Douglas, J.J. concurring), at 297.
139. Id. (Goldberg, J. concurring) at 304. See also Epstein, Was New York Times v.
Sullivan Wrong?, 53 UNIv. CI. L. REv. 783 (1986).
140. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
141. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
142. Id.
143. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733.
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afforded some "false" publications under the New York Times
14 5

test " ' were necessary in order to preserve First Amendment right.

In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,'46 heard together with Asso-

ciated Press v. Walker,14 7 the Supreme Court further extended the
exceptional burden of proof' 45 to public figures: 149
We consider and would hold that a "public figure" who is
not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers. 50

The Court reasoned that the public interest factor in connection with
public figures was not any less than that of public official in justifying this "Times-tinged" rule. 5 1

Still, the language in the two opinions"5 ' is not identical, as was

noted by Chief Justice Warren, 5 8 and other justices in their respective concurring opinions.1 54 All advocated, following Chief Justice
Warren's lead, that there should be no differentiation between public
officials and public figures. The Court appeared to follow these con144. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
145. Id. at 732. See Times Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1970) reh. den. 401 U.S. 1015
(1970). In an article, Time Magazine quoted a complaint involving Pape. Time misattributed
the charges as they related to The Civil Rights Commission's 1961 Report. The Court held
that the reckless standard had not been met, despite the clear evidence of inaccuracy. Id. See
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971). Reckless standard was satisfied with reference to a candidate for public office as "a former small-time bootlegger," Id. at 267, since this
was relevant to his fitness for office. Id.
146. Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
147. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
148. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). To sustain this burden required under
New York Times v. Sullivan, a public figure may inquire into the editorial processes of the
defendant. Id.
149. The definition of public figure applied in this case was: "command[ing] a substantial amount of independent public interest at the time of the publication." Curtis Publishing v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967). A
later case, Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 154 (1974), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1226 (1983), defined
a public figure as a person with pervasive fame or notoriety in all contexts, a persona drawn
into a particular public controversy who becomes a public figure on a limited range of issues,
or, generally, "persons [who] assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions."
Id. at 351. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1976). An individual does not become
a public figure if he earns notice of the public only in response to the publication which he
alleges is defamatory. To be a public figure, an individual must have public stature outside of
the libel incident. See also Schauer, Public Figures, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 905 (1984).
150. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 155; Associated Press, 388 U.S. at 155.
151. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 154; Associated Press, 388 U.S. at 154.
152. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at
130, Associated Press, 388 U.S. at 130.
153. CurtisPublishing, 388 U.S. at 162; Associated Press,388 U.S. at 162 (Warren, J.,
concurring).
154. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 170; Associated Press, 388 U.S. at 170 (Black and
Douglas, J.J. concurring). Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 172; Associated Press, 388 U.S. at
172 (Brennan and White, J.J. concurring).

Winter 1991]

LIBEL SUITS

curring opinions in Greenbelt Publication Association v. Bresler,155
where a public figure claimed defamation in articles which described
his property negotiations with a city as akin to blackmail. 156 The
Court held that the proper instruction for the jury embodied the
New York Times151 standard, rather than the Butt551 standard, even
though Bressler had been expressedly referred to as a "public figure
1 59
in the community.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,'6" the Court formally declined
to continue to distinguish the burden of proof for public and private
figures where the statement in question was an issue of public concern. The Court held that-under these conditions, a private individual must show "clear and convincing proof" under the New York
62
Times definition 6 ' of actual malice in order to prevail.
The Court justified this holding by saying that the reasonable
man standard-whether the reasonable man would have published
under the same or similar circumstances-inadequately protected
the First Amendment freedoms held supreme in the libel cases since
New York Times v. Sullivan.13 The Court explained that "the idea
that certain 'public' figures have voluntarily exposed their entire lives
to public inspection, while private individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal fiction"'' and
noted that "[i]f a matter is not a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private indi65
vidual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved."'
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, 66 the Court rejected the Rosenbloom167

reasoning in an action involving defamation of a private

individual. The Court stated its basis for maintaining a clear line
between these two categories of individuals: "public officials and
public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk
of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them . . . private
155. Greenbelt Publication Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1969).
156. Id. at 8.
157. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
158. Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
159. Greenbelt Publication Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 8.
160. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia; 403 U.S. 29 (1970).
161. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
162. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52.
163. Id. at 50-1.
164. Id. at 48.
165. Id. at 43. See id. (Black, J. concurring) at 57. Justice Black advocates absolute
immunite for the press. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Formal constitutional
privilege against direct inquiry into the editorial process was herein proposed and rejected
under the premise that only absolute immunity would really accomplish the aims of such a
privilege. Id.
166. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
167. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1970). -
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individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public official
and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery." 168 The
Court went on to hold that application of the New York Times
test' 69 to a suit involving a private individual even where the statement involved an issue of public concern would interfere with the
state's interest in providing a remedy when an individual's reputation
has been defamed.1 7 The Court also pointed to the inherent difficulty of the Rosenbloom rule171 which forces courts "to decide on an
ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public
interest' and which do not.'1 2 Rather, in Gertz the Court reserved
to the states determination of the standard of liability for compensatory damages, short of liability without fault.17 The New York
Times standard17 4 would continue to be applied in libel suits brought
by private individuals when presumed or punitive damages were
sought. 7 5
76
In Time v. Firestone1
the Court had the opportunity to decide
between the conflicting principles of Rosenbloom 7 7 and Gertz17 8
when a newspaper misreported the divorce proceedings of Firestone,
a private individual. Choosing to apply the Gertz rule,179 the Court
held that participation in a lawsuit did not turn Firestone into a public figure and that she would therefore still be categorized as a private individual. 8 0 Firestone's claim was remanded to the state court
in order to determine whether there was evidence of fault on the part
of Time.' 8 '
More recently, in Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 8 2 the Supreme Court considered the Gertz requirements of actual malice for the collection of presumed and punitive damages. 88
The case involved Dun & Bradstreet's false reports to five subscribers indicating that Greenmoss had filed a petition in bankruptcy. Declining to impose the Gertz requirement"8 ' upon a non-media defend168. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
169. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
170. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
171. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1970).
172. Id. at 346. See also Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public Interest-The Libel
Law Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 937 (1984).
173. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-8.
174. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
175. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. See also Franklin and Bussel, The Plaintiffis Burden in
Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (1984).
176. Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1975).
177. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1970).
178. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-9.
179. Id.
180. Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1975).
181. Time Inc., 424 U.S. at 464.
182. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1984).
183. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
184. Id.
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ant, the Court stated that "[i]n light of the reduced constitutional
value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that
the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages--even absent a showing of 'actual malice.' "185
The English common law principle of justification for a defamatory statement through proof of truth recently entered into the constitutional defamation considerations of the Supreme Court in the
Court's decision in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps.8 This action arose from allegations that a private citizen, who owned a corporation and The Philadelphia Inquirer, had links to organized
crime which he used to influence state activities. The newspaper article was classified as an issue of public concern.1 87 The court essentially extended the burden of the private plaintiff seeking presumed
and punitive damages as articulated .in Gertz: 88
We believe that the common law's rule on falsity-that the
defendant must bear the burden of proving truth-must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff
bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages . . . .To ensure that true speech on matters of
public concern is not deterred, we hold that the common law
presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when
a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech
of public concern."'
The Court recognized that this decision might, in some instances,
prevent a plaintiff from obtaining relief for the publication of a defamatory statement simply because the plaintiff had no direct proof
of fault and falsity.1 90
2. Sharon v. Time.-Two recent cases filed in the United
States demonstrate how media-protective American libel law has become since New York Times v. Sullivan. The first, Sharon v. Time
actually involved two separate lawsuits, one filed in the United
States and the other in Israel. The action revolved around the allegedly defamatory remarks contained in a single paragraph, the
twenty-second of an eight page article, which appeared in the Febru185. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
186. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1985). See Note, Philadelphia
Newspapers v. Hepps: A Logical Product, 64 DENV. L. REV. 65 (1987); Youm, Truth as a
Libel Defense in the United States: It's Judicial Origin and Statutory Status, 16 ANGLO-AM.

L.

REV.

38 (1987).

187. PhiladelphiaNewspapers, 475 U.S. at 776. This was the same classification as in
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) cert. den. 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
188. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
189. PhiladelphiaNewspapers, 475 U.S. at 776-777.
190. Id. at 778-779.
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ary 21, 1983 issue of Time Magazine.191 The article as a whole concerned the Kahan Commission Report and attributed to Sharon indirect responsibility for the massacre of Palestinians which occurred
shortly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.192
Sharon was particularly angered at Time's mention of a portion
of the report that had not been publicly released, and which implied
that Sharon knew in advance of the impending massacre, and may
possibly have even encouraged it. 193 The American trial resulted in
verdict in favor of Time.' 9 ' While the jury found Time had negligently published a false defamatory statement, because Sharon did
not prove actual malice on the part of Time in publishing the statement, he was not entitled to a verdict. 195
Despite his American defeat, Sharon won his Israeli suit by using the American bifurcated verdict. The Israeli court "held that the
American jury's determination that the words were defamatory and
false applied to this local suit as well."' 9 6 Since Israeli law had no
requirement of actual malice, a verdict could be entered against
Time in Israel.
In September of 1985 the judge awarded Sharon $2,000 in legal
fees, but otherwise put off damages for a separate ruling. 97 On January 23, 1986, both parties settled the suit for an undisclosed
amount.'
Time issued an apology of its error. 9 9 Sharon said in response, "I see in this an achievement for truth and freedom of the
press." 100
3. Desai v. Hersh.-The second recent libel case filed in an
American court is Desai v. Hersh. The plaintiff, Morarji Desai,
served as Prime Minister of India from 1977 to 1979.21 On October
6, 1989, the jury in this case issued a verdict in favor of the defendant, Seymour M. Hersh 202 This $100 million action20 3 revolved
191. Kelly, A General Loses His Case: The Jury Finds No "Malice" But Chastises
Time, TIME, February 4, 1985, at 42 [hereinafter A General Loses His Case].

192. The Kahan Commission report "describ[ed] the final findings of Israel's commission of inquiry into the events surrounding the massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and
Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut." R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 80-82 (1986).
193. Id.
194. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
195.

L.

FORER,

A

CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND INVASION

OF PRIVACY ACTIONS To THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 22 (1987) [hereinafter A CHILLING
EFFECT].
196. M. MAYER, THE LIBEL REVOLUTION: A NEw LOOK AT DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY, 44-5 (1987) [hereinafter THE LIBEL REVOLUTION].

197.

Reuters, January 23, 1986.

198.

Id.

199.
200.
201.
202.

THE LIBEL REVOLUTION, supra note

196, at 45.

Reuters, January 23, 1986.
Newsday, October 7, 1989, at 9.
Reuters, October 7, 1989; The New York Times, October 7, 1989, at 24, col. 1;

The Wall Street Journal, October 9, 1989, at B4, col. 1; Mitchell, What Makes Henry Happy,
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around statements in Hersh's book, "The Price of Power: Kissinger
in the White House." In effect, the book alleged that Desai served as
a CIA conduit before becoming prime minister. The book claims
Desai funneled secret information about Indian foreign policy 204 to
President Nixon and his secretary
of state, Henry Kissinger °5 in ex20 6
annually.
change for $20,000
Attorney for Desai, Cyriak Kappil, said he had felt confident he
could prove Hersh acted with malice. 0° But the jury "found there
was no 'clear and convincing' evidence that Hersh knowingly made
false statements." 20 8 Kappil said he had been hampered by special
evidentiary rulings, namely that persons at the CIA with whom
Hersh talked need not be revealed and that Hersh's sources in general need not be identified, which "made it impossible for him to
rebut Mr. Hersh's charges."' 0 9 Kappil said he was also at a disadvantage because his client had been unable to personally appear in
court.2 1 0
V.

Analysis

The foreign filing of the Pindling and Papandreou actions appears to have triggered panic among media law experts. Referring at
length to the Pindling case filed in Canada, one such expert has been
quoted as saying:
Based on the Canadian decision to hear the Bahamas case, you
could wind up with an Ollie North bringing a libel suit in Canada," says Floyd Abrams, a laywer representing NBC. "It
wouldn't prevent a U.S. President or an American celebrity
from suing and saying their reputation has been hurt in
Canada." ' '
An American Bar Association Journa2 12 article quoted another
TIME, October 16, 1989, at 94; The National Law Journal, October 16, 1989, at 8. Only an
earlier motions hearing had been reported as of the summer of 1990: Desai v. Hersh, 719 F.
Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
203. Reuters, October 7, 1989. But see $2.2 million: The Daily Telegraph, October 7,
1989, at 10; $50 million: United Press International, June 21, 1983; $3.5 million: The Chicago
Tribune, October 5, 1989, at 14, zone C.
204. The New York Times, October 7, 1989, at A24, col. 1.
205. United Press International, June 21, 1983.
206. The New York Times, October 7, 1989, at A24, col. 1.
207. United Press International, September 10, 1989.
208. Reuters, October 6, 1989. See The New York Times, October 7, 1989, at A24, col.
1. See also United Press International, October 6, 1989: "The jury ... concluded that Desai's
attorneys had failed to prove either that Hersh knew his information was false or that he acted
out of malice." Id.
209. The New York Times, October 7, 1989, at A24, col. 1.
210. United Press International, October 7, 1989.
211. Favorable Laws, supra note 1, at B1, col. 3.
212. Moving Abroad, supra note 1,at 38.
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expert as attributing the special attention these two foreign suits
have received to the "very real"'21 possibility that plaintiffs were suing American media defendants elsewhere to avoid the First Amendment protections which prejudice American libel law in favor of the
defendant. Floyd Abrams, First Amendment expert, further commented in this same article that if this suspicion proved true, it
"pose[d] enormous danger to American broadcasters and the American public. 12 14 "If all libel plaintiffs can sue U.S. networks in
whatever country broadcasts happen to reach" Abrams said, "the
American public will have to receive information based upon that
society near us which provides the least legal protection. 21 5
The real question, then, is whether these suits are being filed
outside the United States to avoid American libel law, or whether
they are being legitimately filed for other reasons in countries where
the media company in question broadcasts or publishes.
Pindling's attorney, F. Lee Bailey has cited several reasons for
choosing a Canadian forum rather than either a Bahamian or an
American one. First, he admits that the law in Canada is more
favorable than that in the United States: "there is no future in it for
a public figure [in the U.S.]."216 Second, Bailey says, "also spurring
his decision to sue in the Supreme Court of Ontario were the defeats
Generals Ariel Sharon and William Westmoreland suffered in their
huge libel suits against Time and [Columbia Broadcasting System]
CBS, and the protection given U.S. journalists by New York Times
v. Sullivan."2 1 ' Third, "Mr. Bailey says that close ties exist between
the Bahamas and Canada and that Sir Lynden felt that his reputa2 18
tion had been significantly harmed there."
Fourth,
In 1981, Canada adopted a charter that includes protections similar to the U.S. First Amendment, but court cases haven't tested the extent of those rights or established clear precedents in regard to public figures. Canadian libel law is still
based on English common law which doesn't offer such strong
protection to the press . . . .Sir Lynden may not have to prove
that National Broadcasting System (NBC) operated in reckless
219
disregard of the truth.
213. Id. The expert was Robert D. Sack, attorney, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, New
York, New York and counsel for The Wall Street Journal.
214. Id. at 39. "Although virtually all the libel suits abroad against U.S. news organiza-

tions have been filed by foreign nationals, Abrams warned that there is no reason a U.S.
citizen couldn't sue for instance in Canada, claiming damage to his reputation there." Id.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Favorable Laws. supra note 1, at B1, col. 3.
Moving Abroad, supra note 1, at 38.
Favorable Laws, supra note 1,at B1, col. 3.

219. Id. See also Moving Abroad, supra note 1, at 38: "It's up to the defendant to show
'justification' for the alleged libel. 'You either prove it's true or you pay,' [F. Lee] Bailey
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Fifth, "NBC refused to appear in a Bahamian court where Sir
Lynden originally filed an action. He won an undefended judgment
there but was not awarded any damages."' 2 0 Sixth, Pindling can argue reasonably that his reputation was damaged in Canada because
while the broadcast originated in the United States, it was transmitted, albeit in an unauthorized manner, throughout Canada by cable
stations."2 1
The Canadian court's assumption of jurisdiction over the case
due to these unauthorized broadcasts was originally contested by
National Broadcasting Company (NBC), but the court ruled that
regardless of the licensing situation, the fact remained that the
broadcast had been received in Canada. NBC will try instead to
have the case heard under United States law, arguing that the
broadcast was made with United States libel law, not Canadian libel
law, in mind.222
As in the case of the Pindling suit, the Papandreouaction was
filed in London for a variety of reasons. First, Papandreou did not
file in Greece because such a suit might have raised political concerns.22 ' Second, Leonard Boudin, Papandreou's United States attorney is familiar with the British legal system.22" Third, both he and
his client were most disturbed by a version of the article that ran in
Time's European edition. 22 5 "'The international edition had a little
different story than the American edition of Time and it was accompanied by a lurid cover showing Koskotas behind bars,' Boudin said.
The article carried the headline: 'The looting of Greece: From his
cell a fallen tycoon charges Papandreou with stealing millions.' ",6
Fourth, "the English law of libel is much more favorable than the
American law of libel," Boudin said. "The prime minister, as a public figure, would have had a much harder go at it in the United
States.

227

Papandreou's complaint specifically states:
11. The publication of the words complained of in parasaid." Id.
220. Favorable Laws, supra note 1, at BI, col. 3.
221. Id. See also, Media Imperialism. supra note 11, at 540; A. SMIh,. THE GEOPOUTICS OF INFORMATION: How WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES THE WORLD (1980). The Cana-

dian Radio and Television Commission allows these transmissions despite the protests of
United States broadcasters. It is technologically impossible to prevent the cable stations from
receiving the signals. Libel Law and The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra
note 117, at 750.
222. Favorable Laws, supra note 1, at Bl, col. 3.
223. Moving Abroad, supra note 1, at 38.
224. Id.
225.

Id.

226. United Press International, April 17, 1989.
227. Moving Abroad, supra note 1, at 38. See also Reuters, May 8, 1989: "He [Boudin]
said that because U.S. libel law heavily favored the publisher it would be difficult, if not impossible, to win the case in the United States." Id.
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graph 9 hereof is actionable by the laws of each of the Western
European countries in which Time international is published.
The Plaintiff relies on the presumption
that foreign law is the
228
same as that of England and Wales.
The defendant responded "not admitted"2 2 9 to this allegation, and
stated that "Plaintiff is not entitled to rely on the presumption
pleaded in the second sentence."2 0 Time Magazine may nevertheless
contest the English forum on the grounds that it is inconvenient. 2"' If
the forum were changed to an American court, Time would have
much to gain in terms of the applicable law. Without this defense,
Time will have to prove that whatever it quoted in the article was
true.2 3 1
Of equal importance in determining whether Pindling and Papandreou are forum-shopping are the reasons Sharon and Desai
chose to pursue their actions in American courts. Sharon's attorney
stated in June of 1983 when the suit was first filed that the United
States forum had been specifically chosen because Sharon thought
this was the only way his reputation would be vindicated.2 3s Despite
the fact that American law favored Time, its counsel tried to argue
jurisdiction in the U.S. was not proper, since the suit concerned actions of a foreign government. The difficulties anticipated by Time
were reflected in its inability to depose key witnesses.23 4 As evidenced by Sharon's easy victory in Israeli court, one editorial writer
stated it would have been more advantageous for Sharon to have
filed in Great Britain because under the burden of proof there, he
23
would have won outright. 5
Following the disposition of the American action, Sharon repeatedly claimed a moral victory even though he had been awarded
no damages and had technically lost his case.23 6 Perhaps as explanation, he was quoted in Time Magazine's coverage of the suit as saying, "I came here to prove that Time Magazine lied," he said. "We
managed to prove there was a clear defamation. We came here to
prove that they have done it with negligence and with carelessness.
Altogether, I feel that we have achieved what brought us here to this
228. Statement of Claim at 10, Papandreou v. Time, 1989 P No. 1668 (High Court of
Justice, Queen's Bench filed June 15, 1989).
229. Defence at 3, Papandreou v. Time, 1989 P No. 1668 (High Court of Justice,
Queen's Bench filed September 4, 1989).
230. Id.
231. Moving Abroad, supra note 1, at 39.
232. Newsday, April 18, 1989, at 8, col. 1.
233. A General Loses His Case, supra note 191, at 42.
234. Id.
235. Evans, The Sharon Verdict, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, February 4, 1985, at
74.
236. Reuters, January 23, 1986.
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country." '2- 7

Desai, like Sharon, was primarily concerned with removing the
smudge on his reputation. He filed his action in Chicago because the
Indian community in this city financed his action. a8 In testimony at
trial, Desai stated: "There cannot be any greater damage than to be
called a traitor." Desai said "It is more than financial loss, losing a
reputation. It lessens my capacity to do my public work. It has
strengthened the hand of my critics."2 3 9 Desai's attorney, Cyriac
Kappil had previously told reporters that he and his client had not
placed a specific dollar figure on the injury suffered because "[flor
Mr. Desai the most important thing is not money. He wants his
240

name to be cleared.1

The significance of the Desai defeat may be best illustrated by
several comments of Hersh, the defendant-author, and his attorneys
following disposition of the case. Concerning the impact of the verdict upon future libel suits Hersh said, "It's a terribly important victory for any journalist . . . I think it's going to make it easier for all
the people in my profession," he said. 41 Demonstrating the larger
meaning of his victory Hersh said, "What this says is that somebody
like me can go out and write that even a former prime minister was
a CIA source and get sued and win. 242 Describing the power of the
American press Hersh said, "There was a constitutional issue at
stake here. We do have a lot of power in this country, we in the
press. We have the power to commit calumny in 700 words. The jury
said I wrote the truth. 243
Michael Nussbaum, Hersh's attorney, stated, "To win on truth
is terrific. It's a great decision and a logical one. 24 Nussbaum further referred to the ruling as "a very important illustration that even
a person as prominent as Morarji Desai cannot intimidate an American journalist entitled to his First Amendment protections . . . . We
believe we have taught those who would chill the rights of Mr.
Hersh and those like him that they cannot prevail.

'245

Examination of these four recent libel actions thus indicates
some parallel elements among them. When a foreign plaintiff comes
into a United States court to sue an American media defendant, he
recognizes that he is facing a more difficult burden of proof. Still, he
believes this great tactical disadvantage is outweighed by the higher
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

A General Loses His Case, supra note 191, at 42.
Reuters, October 7, 1989.
United Press International, September 19, 1989.
United Press International, September 11, 1989.
Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1989, A2, col. 4.
United Press International, October 6, 1989.
United Press International, October 7, 1989.
Reuters, October 6, 1989.
The New York Times, October 7, 1989, at A24, col. 1.
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goal of vindicating his reputation in the country where is is believed
to have suffered the most harm. In both the Sharon and Desai cases,
vindication of reputation was the main aim of the United States
action.
When, on the other hand, a plaintiff goes to a foreign court to
sue an American media defendant, he may or may not be motivated
solely by the lure of strategic advantages. The plaintiff may well be
forum-shopping for more positive law. However, the plaintiff may
also be attempting to eliminate some of his defendant's more central
defenses or validly suing where his reputation may be said to have
suffered the most damage due to the international ties of media. If
the Pindling and Papandreouactions had been filed in the countries
in which the plaintiffs are residents, the issue of forum-shopping
would have been more difficult to raise in light of the relevant facts.
It is easy to attribute the so-called trend in suing American media defendants in foreign courts to a single source, namely the
United States' media-protective libel law. But analysis of two current alleged instances of the touted forum-shopping practice, namely
the Pindling and Papandreou cases, indicates that there may be
many forces serving as the basis for the choice of forum in a libel
action.
VI.

Conclusion

Defining anything as a "trend" is risky in the early stages. Taking such action without adequate basis is folly. Reaching the conclusion that there is new trend in suing American media defendants in
foreign courts based upon only a handful of actions is an example of
foolhardy trend prediction.
Plaintiff's counsel in both the Pindling and Papandreou cases
openly admit that the more favorable law across the borders in Canada and across the sea in England is tempting and beneficial to
their respective clients. Still, both admit that there are other reasons
as well for suing in the alternative forum chosen. The reasonable
conclusion based upon the facts of these cases is that we need more
data. We need plaintiffs who have absolutely no basis for suing in
alternative forums to choose to go elsewhere based on the sole fact
that the law there favors them.
If forum-shopping should continue to be viewed as the main
reason that plaintiffs sue American media defendants in foreign
courts, with the other motives assuming secondary positions, one potential means2 4 of stopping the spread of the practice would be to
246. Another possible solution would be to develop an international policy whereby foreign courts would limit their assumption of jurisdiction until valid basis for such action had
been asserted by the plaintiff to a requisite standard of proof.
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take more seriously the recent proposals for reform of libel law.2 47
Perhaps if concessions were made in certain areas, bringing a libel
suit in the United States would once again become a viable option
for defamed plaintiffs.
Constitutional defamation law favors the American media defendant. But preventing plaintiffs from arbitrarily seeking relief in
foreign courts will ultimately save American media defendants time
and money. Reform thus protects, not undercuts, their interests. In

short, we must act conservatively in pronouncing a trend in forumshopping for foreign libel suits, but aggressively in preventing its
possible existence.
Kathleen A. O'Connell

247. Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program, Proposal for the
Reform of Libel Law, COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER, Winter 1989, at 1; see Mauro, Critics
Gang Up On ... The Annenburg Libel Plan, WASHINGTON JOURNALSM REVIEW, April 1989,
at 36-7; see also A CHILLING EFFECT, supra note 195; R. BEZANSON, LIBEL LAW AND THE
PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY (1987). Reform would seem to draw support from media as well.
Following the Sharon case, members of the communications industry spoke openly of how the
suit itself, and Time's defensive conduct within it had negatively impacted upon the public's
perception of the press. Some journalists began to advocate complete immunity for the press as
a means of avoiding similar suits in the future. Others argued that the Sharon case demonstrated the difficulties in balancing all the interests involved in a libel suit. Journalists spoke
openly about how fear of such suits was forcing them to report conservatively. A General
Loses His Case, supra note 191, at 42. See also The Washington Post, January 23, 1'985, at
E19, col. 1. One observer, Floyd Abrams, forecasted potentially negative ramifications saying,
"Time's ultimate victory would cause public officials to "think twice" before launching libel
suits, 'because they may lose on actual malice.'" A General Loses His Case, supra note 191,
at 42.

